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BOOTSTRAPPING A MALICE REQUIREMENT INTO ADEA
LIQUIDATED DAMAGE AWARDS-Dreyer v. ARCO Chemical,
801 F.2d 651 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S.
Mar. 2, 1987) (No. 86-1062).
In Dreyer v. ARCO Chemical, I the Third Circuit announced a standard
for double damage awards under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) that departs radically from the standard the Supreme Court
deemed acceptable in Trans World Airlines v. Thurston.2 The ADEA3
protects employees over forty from discrimination on the basis of age. In
order to enforce the Act, Congress created a two-tier remedy scheme: 4 one,
equitable and legal remedies to reimburse discrimination victims; and two,
liquidated damages (hereinafter "double damages" 5) to punish and deter
employers from committing "willful" violations.
Before the Supreme Court issued its Thurston opinion, federal courts
struggled with the definition of a willful violation. The statute requires
proof that the employer acted because of the employee's age.6 Courts
interpreted this clause to require intentional discrimination. Willfulness
and intent are inextricably related concepts. Nevertheless, the courts tried
to separate proof of intent and proof of willfulness. The courts developed a
threshold inquiry into intent to prove liability, and a separate, unrelated
inquiry into willfulness to justify a double damage award. The confusion
spread when eight circuits developed eight separate willfulness defini-
tions. 7 After Thurston, most circuits accepted the Supreme Court's
willfulness definition. Dreyer represents the Third Circuit's effort to re-
solve the remaining conceptual problems.
Under the Dreyer standard, fact patterns involving discrete employment
decisions require additional evidence of outrageous conduct to meet the
willfulness standard. In fact patterns involving a policy or plan, however,
1. 801 F.2d 651(3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. Mar. 2,1987) (No. 86-1062).
2. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634(1982), amendedbyAgeDiscrimination in EmploymentAmendments of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100 Stat. - (1986).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
5. Courts compute liquidated damages by awarding an additional amount equal to the pecuniary
damages, thus doubling the amount of damages the plaintiff receives.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1982).
7. Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1981); Hedrick v. Hercules, 658
F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1981); Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 645 F2d 127 (2d Cir. 1981); Spagnuolo v.
Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1981); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974 (9th
Cir. 1981); Mistrettav. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1980); Wehrv. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d
276 (3d Cir. 1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979); see also Comment, The
Standard of Willfulnessfor LiquidatedDamages Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 32
EMORY L.L 583 (1983).
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the Third Circuit stated it will follow Thurston and award double damages
where the employer "knew or showed reckless disregard for. . . whether
its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA. "8
Although the Third Circuit correctly identified a possible internal incon-
sistency in Thurston, it employed the wrong analytic framework. The
Dreyer standard creates a remedy system inconsistent with ADEA pur-
poses, and, by design, avoids punishing intentional discrimination cases.
After examining the Dreyer standard, this Note concludes that the Thurston
standard should be followed and that double damages should be awarded
based on conscious and unconscious violations of the ADEA.
I. BACKGROUND TO THE ADEA AND THE WILLFULNESS
STANDARD
A. ADEA Purposes, Prohibitions, and Remedies
Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967 to promote employment of older
persons, prohibit "arbitrary age discrimination," and educate employers
about age discrimination. 9 Congress designed the ADEA discrimination
prohibitions to parallel those found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 10
The ADEA correspondingly forbids employers to make employment deci-
sions or enact policies because of age. I I
Rather than completely mirror Title VII, 12 Congress incorporated some
8. Dreyer v. ARCO Chemical, 801 F.2d 651, 656 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3586
(U.S. May 2, 1987) (No. 86-1062).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b)(1982).
10. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978). Title ViI is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1982). Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex,
religion, and national origin.
11. Section 4(a) of the Act forbids employers:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or to otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a). As originally enacted, the Act protected employees aged 40 to 64. Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 12, 81 Stat. 602, 607 (1967). On January 1,
1979, Congress raised the upper age limit to 69. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3, 92 Stat. 189, 189-90 (1978). On January 1, 1987, Congress
eliminated the upper age limit. Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-592, 100 Stat. - (1986).
12. Congress chose Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) rather than Title VII remedies and enforce-
ment mechanisms because it wanted to take advantage of the existing Department of Labor bu-
reaucracy. Congress was concerned about lengthy EEOC charge processing backlogs, and wanted to
avoid the possibility that age discrimination enforcement would be neglected in favor of other forms of
discrimination. Age Discrimination in Employment, 1967: Hearings on S. 830, S. 788 Before the
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of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)13 remedies into the ADEA by
reference. 14 In addition, the ADEA grants courts the power to award "such
legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of
this chapter.' 15 The statutory, legal, and equitable remedies presently
available to the plaintiff include pecuniary awards of back pay and benefits,
reinstatement, "front pay" in lieu of reinstatement, and double damages for
willful violations. 16 In contrast, Title VII remedies are limited to back pay
and equitable remedies such as reinstatement. 17 Federal circuit courts of
appeals unanimously hold that common law punitive, pain and suffering,
and emotional distress damages are not available under the ADEA. 18
This Note focuses on the Act's double or "liquidated damage" clause. 19
The ADEA double damages award merges two concepts from the FLSA:
one, the FLSA automatically awards double damages for any violations; 20
and, two the FLSA imposes criminal penalties for willful violations. 2'
Instead of automatically awarding double damages, as under the FLSA, the
ADEA provides double damages if the violation is willful. Thus, the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 24
(1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits); id. at 29 (remarks of Sen. Smathers); id. at 396 (statement of National
Retail Merchants Association).
The Department of Labor's dominion over age discrimination did not last. Congress transferred age
discrimination enforcement to the EEOC as part of President Carter's 1978 reorganization plan. Reorg.
Plan No. I of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1979), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1155 (1982), and in 92 Stat. 3781
(1978).
Congress also incorporated FLSA remedies because of dissatisfaction with Title VII procedures and
remedies. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584-85, 585 n. 14 (1978). In Lorillard, the Court held
that incorporating FLSA procedures and remedies demonstrated Congress' intent that jury trials be
available in ADEA suits. Id. at 585. Title VII would not necessarily allow jury trials. The inference to be
drawn is that FLSA remedies and procedures are more helpful to age discrimination victims than are
Title VII remedies and procedures.
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219,251-262 (1982). The FLSA establishes minimum standards for wages
and hours, and penalizes employers who fail to pay mandatory overtime and keep required records.
14. Section 7(b) of the ADEA states:
[t]he provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and
procedures provided in sections 211(b), 216 (except for subsection (a) thereof), and 217 of this title,
and subsection (c) of this section.
29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). Section 216 defines FLSA remedies. "Subsection (a) thereof" refers to the
imposition of criminal penalties for "willful" violations.
15. Id.
16. Id. For a discussion of "front pay" in lieu of reinstatement, see Note, Front Pay: A Necessary
Alternative to Reinstatement Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 53 FORDHAM L. REv.
579 (1984); Annotation, Award of "Front Pay" Under§ 7 oftheAge Discrimination in EmploymentAct
of 1967, 74 A.L.R. FED. 745 (1985).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 71-77.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982): "Provided, [t]hat liquidated damages shall be payable only in cases
of willful violations of this chapter."
20. Id. § 216(b).
21. Id. § 216(a).
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ADEA eliminates the FLSA criminal penalties for willful violations.
Congress enacted the ADEA hybrid damages and eliminated criminal
penalties in order to preserve a punitive and deterrent effect and avoid the
proof problems of a criminal penalty.22
B. Proof of Disparate Treatment Under the ADEA: The Inquiry Into
Intent
Disparate treatment analysis, which focuses on the employer's intent, is
the most common model of proof used by ADEA litigants. 23 Disparate
treatment cases follow two fact patterns. First, cases like Dreyer, where
22. 113 CONG. REC. 7076 (1967); see also Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125
(1985) (Court recognizes that Congress intended that the ADEA avoid difficult problems of proof for
plaintiff-employees).
23. Litigants may also use the disparate impact model to prove discrimination when there is a
facially neutral policy or practice that has a heavier negative impact on persons within a protected class.
Player, Title VII Impact Analysis Applied to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Is a Transplant
Appropriate? 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 1261, 1267-68 (1983) [hereinafter Impact Analysis]. Once the
plaintiff demonstrates, usually by statistical analysis, an unequal impact on the protected class, an
employer must then prove the disputed practice's business necessity. There is usually no need to prove
discriminatory intent or motive in disparate impact analysis. "Business necessity" is an affirmative
defense, so the burden is on the employer to prove necessity by a preponderance of the evidence.
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977). The plaintiff may
choose to attack the business necessity defense by proving that the reasons advanced are a pretext for
age discrimination, Gathercole v. Global Associates, 560 F. Supp. 642, 648 n.ll (N.D. Cal. 1983),
rev'd on other grounds, 727 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1984), thus putting the defendant's intent at issue. In
addition, the plaintiff may choose to attack the business necessity defense by providing proof of
alternative methods for achieving the business purpose which have a lesser negative impact on the
protected group. Criswell v. Western Air Lines, 709 F.2d 544, 554 (9th Cir. 1983).
The disparate impact model of proof is suited for seeking out and eliminating discrimination that may
be caused by unconscious stereotypes. Several courts of appeals have stated that disparate impact
analysis is appropriate for proving age discrimination claims. See EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d
1390 (9th Cir. 1984); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983); Geller v.
Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981). The Third Circuit has left
open whether disparate impact analysis is appropriate in age discrimination claims. Massarsky v.
General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983).
Defendants and commentators have attacked the application of disparate impact analysis to age
discrimination cases. See EEOC v. Governor Mifflin School Dist., 623 F. Supp. 734,739-40 (E.D. Pa.
1985); Impact Analysis, supra, at 1261; Stacy, A Case Against Extending the Adverse Impact Doctrine
toADEA, 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 437 (1984-85). These persons advance a variety of arguments based
on the "reasonable factors other than age" defense in 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). For example, one author
argues the "reasonable factor" defense authorizes an employer to use any reasonable age neutral factor
regardless of its impact. Impact Analysis, supra, at 1272. Similarly, the defendant in Governor Mifflin
argued the "reasonable factor" language compelled the conclusion that the ADEA reaches only to
intentional discrimination. Governor Mifflin, 623 F. Supp. at 740. Courts have not been receptive to
these arguments, and have pointed to the strong similarity in the language of Title VII and the ADEA.
Id; see also Comment, Disparate Impact Analysis and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 68
MINN. L. REv. 1038 (1984) (arguing that disparate impact analysis is consistent with the ADEA and
necessary to achieve ADEA's remedial purposes).
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plaintiffs challenge decisions to discharge, or refusals to hire or promote a
single individual. This Note labels such cases "discrete employment deci-
sions." Second, cases like Thurston, where the employer's policy or plan
imposes a difference in salary, benefits, or working conditions based
directly on age.24 This Note labels such cases "age-based policy patterns."
The plaintiff carries the burden of proving age discrimination by a
preponderance of the evidence.25 Federal courts generally agree that age
need not be the sole factor in the employer's decision.26 A plaintiff need
only show that age was the determining factor; in other words, "but for" the
employee's age, the action would not have been taken. 27
Under the disparate treatment model of proof, the plaintiff may prove
discriminatory intent by direct or indirect evidence. Direct evidence may be
found in overtly discriminatory statements or policies which, on their face,
discriminate on the basis of age. Indirect proof of the employer's intent
follows a three-step analysis: first, the plaintiff must demonstrate a prima
facie case;28 second, the employer must articulate a nondiscriminatory
reason for its action;29 and third, the plaintiff must then present evidence
showing that the employer's stated reason is a pretext for discrimination. 30
The ADEA provides several statutory affirmative defenses. Under the
ADEA, age may be a bona fide occupational qualification for the position,
the action may be taken pursuant to a bona fide seniority system, or the
24. Player, Proof of Disparate Treatment Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act:
Variations on a Title VII Theme, 17 GA. L. REV. 621, 625 (1983) [hereinafter Disparate Treatment].
25. Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1017-19 (lst Cir. 1979).
26. ' Perrell v. FinanceAmerica, 726 F.2d 654, 656 (10th Cir. 1984); Cancellier v. Federated Dep't
Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d
1003, 1019 (Ist Cir. 1979).
27. See cases cited supra note 26.
28. The factors for establishing a prima facie case vary, depending upon the circuit and whether the
challenged decision is one to hire, promote, or discharge. Disparate Treatment, supra note 24, at
634-44. In the Ninth Circuit, a prima facie case for discharge requires evidence that: first, the plaintiff is
a member of the protected class; second, the plaintiff was performing satisfactorily in his job; third, the
plaintiff was discharged; and, fourth the employer replaced the plaintiff with a substantially younger
employee who had equal or inferior qualifications. Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 532-33 (9th
Cir. 1981). The elements of a prima facie case are defined because the courts believe that, if those
elements are not rebutted, it is more likely than not that the defendant was illegally motivated.
Disparate Treatment, supra note 24, at 627-28.
29. The legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action must be introduced through admissible
evidence. Disparate Treatment, supra note 24, at 631. Mere denial of a discriminatory motive is
insufficient to withstand a directed verdict for the plaintiff. Id.
30. Typical forms of pretext evidence include direct evidence such as statements or memoranda,
statistical evidence, and evidence that the allegedly nondiscriminatory reason was not uniformly
applied. Id. at 662-65. Once all of the evidence has been produced, the trier of fact must decide whether
the plaintiff, by a preponderance of the evidence, carried the burden of showing a discriminatory intent.
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action may be taken pursuant to a bona fide employee benefit plan. 31 These
defenses are, by their nature, applicable only to age-based policy patterns.
Once the plaintiff has established a disparate treatment case by direct or
indirect proof, thus justifying pecuniary damages, the factfinder decides
whether the employer willfully violated the Act, thereby justifying double
damages. The definition of willfulness has plagued courts since the
ADEA's inception. The statute does not define willfulness. Consequently,
the courts of appeals were divided over what employer conduct constituted
a willful violation sufficient to allow a double damage award. 32
C. Trans World Airlines v. Thurston: Trying to Define Willfulness
The Supreme Court addressed the willfulness issue for the first time in
Trans World Airlines v. Thurston.33 Thurston involved an age-based policy
pattern. 34 The Court affirmed the Second Circuit's standard, which awards
double damages if the employer "knew or showed reckless disregard for the
matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA." 35 The Court
stated that the "know or recklessly disregard" standard is an "acceptable"
definition. 36
The Court concluded that Congress intended to establish two tiers of
damages: first, pecuniary damages, which make the plaintiff whole; and
second, double damages, which the Court concluded are punitive in
nature.37 The Court endorsed the "knew or showed reckless disregard"
standard instead of the "in the picture" standard used in some circuits. The
"in the picture" standard awarded double damages where the employer
simply knew its acts were governed by the ADEA. The Court rejected the
"in the picture" standard because it required a double damage award in
almost every instance the employer was found liable.38
Nevertheless, the Court reversed the Second Circuit for misapplying the
knew or recklessly disregarded standard. 39 The defendant had made a good
31. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1), (2) (1982).
32. See supra note 7.
33. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
34. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 114-20. Several plaintiffs challenged the defendant's complex job
bidding practices for pilots and flight engineers. Federal aviation regulations prohibit pilots from flying
once they reach age 60. There is no mandatory age regulation for flight engineers. The defendant's
policy allowed pilots disqualified from flying for reasons other than age to "bump" to flight engineer
positions. Pilots disqualified because of age, however, were required to follow a complex bidding
procedure for flight engineer openings, which negatively affected their employment conditions.
35. Id. at 126.
36. Id. at 129. By doing so, the Court left the door open for other formulations.
37. Id. at 125.
38. Id. at 127-28 (Because employers must post ADEA notices, every time an employer discrimi-
nates on the basis of age, the employer will know that the ADEA is "in the picture.").
39. Id. at 129.
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faith effort to determine if its policy violated the Act by consulting legal
counsel and negotiating with the union.40 Based on these efforts, the
defendant believed in good faith that its policy was consistent with the
Act.41 The employer defended the policy on the grounds that it met the
standards of the bona fide occupational qualification and bona fide sen-
iority system defenses.42 Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the
violation was not willful because the facts did not support a finding that the
employer knew or recklessly disregarded whether its conduct violated the
Act. 43 After the Supreme Court decided Thurston, courts of appeals
uniformly applied the knew or recklessly disregarded standard to age-based
policy patterns44 and to discrete employment decisions. 45 Dreyer is the lone
exception.
II. THE DECISION: DREYER v. ARCO CHEMICAL
A. Facts and Procedure
Plaintiffs Dreyer and Strayer worked in the Financial Controls Depart-
ment of an ARCO plant in Pennsylvania. Defendant ARCO consolidated
some of its operations, reducing the work force size in plaintiffs' depart-
ment. ARCO alleged that it laid off Dreyer and Strayer because of the
departmental restructuring.46
Plaintiffs filed suit together, claiming intentional and willful violations
of the ADEA. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs and
40. Id. at 129-30.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 122.
43. Id. at 130.
44. EEOC v. Wyoming Retirement Sys., 771 F.2d 1425, 1431 (10th Cir. 1985) (EEOC challenged
state employee mandatory retirement statute; defendants concluded ADEA inapplicable in good faith
and in reliance upon counsel's advice); Whitfield v. City of Knoxville, 756 F.2d 455,463--64 (6th Cir.
1985) (city had good faith belief ADEA not applicable to state and local governments).
45. Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, 803 E2d 1488, 1496 (9th Cir. 1986) (jury award of double
damages to discharged car sales manager reversed and remanded for reconsideration under Thurston
standard); Smith v. Consolidated Mut. Water, 787 F.2d 1441, 1443 (10th Cir. 1986) (discharged
employee received pecuniary damages, but not double damages because of thin evidence at trial);
Archambault v. United Computing Sys., 786 F.2d 1507, 1513-14 (11th Cir. 1986) (branch manager of
sales office discharged in violation of ADEA; remand to district court for determination of willfulness
under Thurston standard); Galvan v. Bexar County, 785 E2d 1298, 1307 (5th Cir. 1986) (double damage
award upheld where testimony revealed age was explicit reason for not reinstating plaintiff); Wilhelm v.
Blue Bell, Inc., 773 F2d 1429, 1435 (4th Cir. 1985) (remand on willfulness issue because trial court
gave "in the picture" instruction to the jury); Gilkerson v. Toastmaster, Inc., 770 F.2d 133,136-37 (8th
Cir. 1985) (upheld jury award of pecuniary damages based on sufficiency test, although court clearly
disagreed with verdict; reversed double damage award because no evidence that defendant knew the
conduct violated ADEA).
46. Dreyer v. ARCO Chemical, 801 F.2d 651 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S.
Mar. 2, 1987) (No. 86-1062).
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awarded double damages to Dreyer. 47 The Third Circuit upheld the defen-
dant's liability for ADEA violations, but reversed the jury's willfulness
finding.48 In so doing, the Third Circuit announced a new standard for
assessing willfulness in cases involving discrete employment decisions,
overruling its prior willfulness standard. 49 The Dreyer standard requires
evidence of outrageous conduct to support a double damages award.50
B. Reasoning
The Third Circuit distinguished between the two disparate treatment fact
patterns. 51 The Third Circuit agreed with other federal courts that the
Thurston standard should apply in cases where the employer embarked
upon a generally applicable policy or plan. 52 In these cases, double
damages will not result in every case because evidence of the employer's
good faith or reasonable belief that the policy did not violate the Act will
negate a knowing or reckless mental state. 53
47. Id. at 653. The court does not explain why Strayer did not receive a liquidated damage award.
Strayer did not appeal the jury verdict.
48. Id. at 659.
49. Id. at 657-58.
50. Id. at 658.
51. Id.
52. Id. This language is broad enough to apply to disparate impact cases as well. See supra note 23.
Double damages will probably not be awarded in disparate impact cases, since intent or knowledge is
generally not at issue. However, if the plaintiff is able to show that the employer's business necessity
defense conceals deliberate age discrimination, then double damages may be awarded.
53. Dreyer, 801 F.2d at 656. The Third Circuit in Dreyer may have confused the burdens of proof
and production under the Thurston standard, and may have erroneously assigned the burden of proving
good faith under the Thurston standard to the employer-defendant. In Dreyer, the Third Circuit stated
that the employer should show good faith under the Thurston standard. Id. at 658. The court did not
indicate whether it was imposing a burden of proof or a burden of production on the employer. The court
may have made this error by confusing good faith under the Thurston standard with the statutory FLSA
good faith defense to double damage awards.
"Good faith" and "reasonable belief" in the ADEA context only serve to negate willfulness and,
thus, are elements of the plaintiff's case-in-chief. The ultimate burden of proving the employer acted
with knowledge or reckless disregard should remain with the plaintiff-employee. However, courts
should impose a burden of production for evidence of good faith on the employer because such evidence
is under the control of the employer, and the plaintiff would have extreme difficulty locating evidence to
disprove good faith.
The Supreme Court reasoned in Thurston that the employer's good faith belief that it did not violate
the Act meant that it did not have the "knowledge" necessary to show willfulness. With this reasoning,
the Court did not adopt the FLSA "good faith" affirmative defense to the award of double damages. The
FLSA defense mitigates the automatic double damage award; it is not applicable to the imposition of
criminal penalties. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1982). The Supreme Court stated in Thurston that ADEA double
damages are a substitute for the FLSA criminal penalty provisions. Trans World Airlines v. Thurston,
469 U.S. 111, 125-26 (1985). The Court cited FLSA precedent to support its reasoning that the
defendant's good faith and reasonable belief meant that the violation of the ADEA was not willful. Id. at
129. The case cited, Nabob Oil v. United States, 190 F.2d 478 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 876
(1951), makes no reference to the statutory FLSA "good faith" defense. Instead, it refers to the
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Nevertheless, the court stated that the Thurston standard is "not easily
incorporated" in a case alleging age discrimination in a discrete employ-
ment decision, because it results in a double damage award in every
situation. 54 The court reasoned that the ADEA as interpreted in Thurston
requires two tiers of damages. 55 Yet the "knew or showed reckless dis-
regard" standard would allow a double damage award in every discrete
employment decision case where the employer violated the ADEA. 56 In
such cases, liability by definition includes a finding that the employer
intentionally acted because of the employee's age.57 The court implicitly
defendant's "reasonable belief" that the plan it was following did not violate the FLSA and did not
warrant criminal penalties. Nabob Oil, 190 F.2d at 479.
Under Thurston, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the employer acted with knowledge or
reckless disregard. The defendant has the burden of producing evidence of good faith. Unlike the FLSA
good faith defense, the employer is not obligated to prove its good faith and reasonable belief by a
preponderance of the evidence. To the extent that the court in Dreyer confused good faith under the
Thurston standard with the FLSA statutory defense, it erred.
54. Dreyer, 801 F.2d at 656-57.
55. Id. at 657.
56. Id. at 656-57. A surprising number of cases have awarded pecuniary damages for ADEA
liability, but denied a double damage award. See McNeil v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 800 F2d Ill
(7th Cir. 1986); EEOC v. Community Unit School Dist. No. 9,642 F Supp. 902 (S.D. I11. 1986); Durso
v. Wanamaker, No. 83-1385 (E.D. Pa. June 12, 1986); Gregory v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 41
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1579 (E.D. Pa. May 21, 1986); McDowell v. Avtex Fibers, Inc., No.
81-4822 (E.D. Pa. March 20, 1986); Spanierv. Morrison's Management Servs., 611 F. Supp. 642 (N.D.
Ala. 1985); Bemdt v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, 604 F Supp. 962 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 789
F.2d 253 (3d Cir. 1986). Unfortunately, the courts do not analyze the apparent contradiction between a
finding of intentional discrimination and a finding of a lack of knowledge or willful disregard under the
Thurston standard. The courts are constrained to uphold the verdict because of the sufficiency of
evidence standard. Nevertheless, the courts deny double damages because the evidence does not
support a finding that the defendant's state of mind met the Thurston standard. The decisions are result-
oriented. The courts are obviously uncomfortable with any liability finding, and disagree with the jury
verdict. Nevertheless, the court grants the defendant some relief by issuing ajudgment notwithstanding
the verdict on double damages.
The cases are not well reasoned. The cases suggest, however, that a gloss on the Thurston standard
might reconcile the logical dilemma the Third Circuit presents in Dreyer. The courts seem to be
searching for some item of evidence, other than circumstantial evidence needed to support a jury
finding, to justify the double damage award. With the exception of Spanier, the courts have not looked
for evidence of outrageous or aggravated conduct. If some additional evidence is required, two tiers of
damages may be possible in discrete employment decision cases. If the evidence required does not rise
to the high outrageous conduct standard, it would not create the problems discussed in this Note.
Nevertheless, nothing in Thurston indicates that separate evidence is needed to establish liability for
double damages.
57. In age discrimination cases prior to Thurston some courts found this concept troublesome. For
example, in Syvock v. Milwaukie Boiler Mfg., 665 F2d 149 (7th Cir. 1981), the court considered an age
discrimination case factually similar to Dreyer. There, the Seventh Circuit articulated a standard
essentially similar to Thurston's: the defendant's actions were knowing and voluntary and it knew or
reasonably should have known its actions violated the ADEA. Id. at 156. In dicta, Syvock refused to
differentiate between willful and nonwillful violations based on the distinction between disparate
impact and disparate treatment cases, because it concluded that nothing in the legislative history
supported such a distinction. Id. at 155. The court stated that there ought to be two levels of liability in
disparate treatment cases as well. Id. at 155 & n.7. Syvock reasoned that unconscious violations were
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recognized that evidence of good faith or reasonable belief will not negate
the employer's discriminatory intent: in order to find liability, the jury must
already have concluded that the employer's nondiscriminatory reasons
were a pretext for age discrimination. 58 Constructive knowledge of the
ADEA's application will be imputed from the Act's posting require-
ments. 59
To resolve the ostensible conflict between the two-tier requirement and
the single-tier effect of the knew or recklessly disregarded standard in
discrete employment decision cases, the Third Circuit developed an out-
rageous conduct standard. The court sought a willfulness standard that
distinguishes between violations in discrete employment decision cases,
which are "almost always" intentional, and violations where double
damages should be awarded to punish the employer.60 The court contrasted
age-based policy plans with discrete employment decisions, concluding in
possible in disparate treatment cases as well as in disparate impact cases. Id. Presumably, Syvock was
referring to disparate treatment cases involving discrete employment decisions, since it decided such a
fact pattern. Unfortunately, Syvock failed to produce an example of an unconscious violation in a
disparate treatment case, so it is impossible to tell whether it had the Thurston fact pattern in mind or
whether the court thought it was possible to find an unconscious violation in a discrete employment
decision. No cases since Syvock have found an unconscious violation in an individual employment
decision. Since the essence of proof in these cases is an inquiry into the employer's intent, this result
seems theoretically impossible. As one court that tried to apply Syvock noted:
In a "disparate treatment" case ... [precedent] require[s] an ultimate showing of an intent to
discriminate, and that any articulated non-discriminatory reason necessarily is a pretext. How can
a facially non-discriminatory scheme be a pretext and yet there be no intent to discriminate?...
In fact, it is difficult if not impossible to make sense of congressional intent in 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)
as long as the federal courts continue to apply [Title VII precedent] to ADEA cases and refuse to
acknowledge the possibility of liability for non-intentional age discrimination. . . . [A]s a
practical matter, [double] damages are virtually automatic if there is to be any monetary recovery
at all by the employee.
Cowen v. Standard Brands, 572 F. Supp. 1576, 1580-81 (N.D. Ala. 1983).
Given that disparate treatment requires proof of intent, the distinction between conscious and
unconscious violations only makes sense if viewed in terms of the difference between the Thurston and
Dreyer fact patterns.
Group decisionmaking in employment actions is common, and is another area where unconscious
violations in discrete employment situations could arguably be found. Conceivably, the employee's
direct supervisor may make an intentionally discriminatory employment decision which is innocently
ratified by higher levels of management. Berndt v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, 604 F. Supp.
962, 967 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 789 F.2d 253 (3d Cir. 1986), suggests such a defense to plaintiff's
allegations of willfulness. This result is undesirable, because employers should be responsible for
intentional actions of supervisors. The result is also illogical, since the first-level supervisor's intent has
been imputed to the employer. A court's already difficult inquiries into intent are severely complicated
when several persons are involved in a potentially discriminatory employment decision.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 23-31.
59. Dreyer v. ARCO Chemical, 801 F.2d 651 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S.
Mar. 2, 1987) (No. 86-1062).
60. Id. at 657.
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the latter that the plaintiff must prove outrageous conduct to receive double
damages.61
The court did not define outrageous. In common usage "outrageous"
means involving or doing great injury or wrong; exceeding all bounds of
decency or reasonableness. 62 The Dreyer court also declined to provide
specific examples of situations where a factfinder could find willfulness.
The court suggested a few possible situations, but noted that in most cases
the award would depend upon an ad hoc inquiry into the particular facts. 63
The court relied upon Thurston's assertion that double damages are
intended to be punitive to support the outrageous conduct requirement. 64
The Third Circuit found its standard in the discussion of punitive damages
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908.65 The Dreyer 'court rejected
that portion of the Restatement language referring to an inquiry into "evil
motive and reckless disregard of the rights of others," because Thurston
had disclaimed a need to show "evil motive" as an element of willfulness. 66
Instead, the court focused on additional language in the Restatement
defining punitive damages as an award given to punish the defendant for
outrageous conduct and to deter him and others from similar conduct. 67
III. ANALYSIS
Dreyer and Thurston cannot coexist, because different circuits interpret-
ing the same statute will be applying different standards to reach different
results. Furthermore, Dreyer is inconsistent with the Act's goals and
61. Id. at 658. The court stated:
In sum, in some ADEA violations that are claimed to be willful, it will be sufficient to uphold a
finding of willfulness through evidence that the defendant embarked on a policy or generally
applicable course of conduct which it knew violated the ADEA or that it acted in reckless disregard
of whether that conduct violated the Act. If an employer can show good faith and reasonable
grounds for believing it was not in violation of the Act, a willfulness finding would be inappropri-
ate.
Where an employer makes a decision such as termination of an employee because of age, the
employer will or should have known that the conduct violated the Act. Nonetheless, in order that
the [double) damages be based on evidence that does not merely duplicate that needed for the
compensatory damages, there must be some additional evidence of outrageous conduct.
Id. (citation omitted).
62. WEBSTE'S UNABRIDGED DiCmONARY 1271 (2d ed. 1983).
63. Dreyer, 801 F.2d at 658.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 657.
66. Id. (citing Thurston, 469 U.S. at 126 n.19).
67. Id. at 657.
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structure. Dreyer fails to appropriately punish intentional age discrimina-
tion. Although Dreyer recognized a significant issue, it developed a stan-
dard that distorts the proper purpose and function of the ADEA.
A. Dreyer and Thurston Cannot Coexist
If the circuits apply different willfulness standards to similar facts, the
lack of uniformity and predictability will lead to forum shopping and
inequitable enforcement of the Act. The outrageous conduct standard
places a high burden on the typical plaintiff because the employer often
expresses plausible reasons for its actions. The employer's actions rarely
appear to be grossly offensive or outside the bounds of decency. Therefore,
double damages will be available in far fewer cases under the Dreyer
standard.
An example illustrates the point. The hypothetical plaintiff is a 55-year-
old middle manager demoted during a legitimate business consolidation
and denied a transfer to another job for which he is arguably qualified.
Substantially younger employees in equivalent positions retain their jobs or
are transferred to lateral positions. The plaintiff's new position has less
status and responsibility, but the employer continues to pay plaintiff's
original salary. He is in constant conflict with his new, younger supervisor
and quits. The plaintiff alleges age discrimination and asks for pecuniary
and double damages. He asserts that he was demoted, denied transfer, and
constructively discharged from his last position because of his age. The
employer asserts that it demoted the plaintiff because of poor performance.
It asserts that the younger employees receiving transfers were more
qualified than the plaintiff. The employer denies constructively discharging
the plaintiff, and claims the plaintiff was surly and uncooperative. Both
sides present contradictory evidence. The employer has prominently
posted the red, white, and blue ADEA bulletin.
Applying Dreyer and Thurston to these facts produces different results.
An appeals court would easily affirm a pecuniary damages award under
either standard. Under the Thurston standard, a willfulness verdict would
also be upheld. The appeals court could conclude that the plaintiff satisfac-
torily proved willfulness by showing that the employer intentionally dis-
criminated against the plaintiff while constructively aware that the Act
applied. None of the employer's conduct, however, seems grossly offensive
or indecent. Thus, the employer may escape double damages under Dreyer.
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B. Dreyer Is Inconsistent With the ADEA's Remedial Statutory Goals
and Statutory Structure
Congress enacted the ADEA to remedy the harms older workers suffer
from pervasive employer misconceptions about the relationship of age to
ability. 68 When Congress enacted the ADEA, it recognized that unemploy-
ment affects older workers more severely than younger workers. 69 It
emphasized the physical and psychological hardships older workers suffer
due to pervasive age discrimination. 70 Consequently, any court construing
the ADEA is unfaithful to congressional intent unless the court interprets
the Act consistently with its broad remedial purposes.
Double damages are punitive in nature, but Congress recognized that a
necessary secondary impact of readily available double damages is to
provide some compensation for nonpecuniary losses. Readily available
double damages partially substitute for the lack of common law compen-
satory damages for pain and suffering and emotional distress. 71 The Act
68. 113 CONG. REc. 34,740 (1967) (testimony of Rep. Perkins).
69. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(3) (1982) (statement of legislative findings and conclusions concerning
noneconomic harms); 113 CONG. Rc. 34,751 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Dwyer).
70. See supra note 69.
71. Double damages have both punitive and compensatory aspects. In the Senate floor debates
before the ADEA's adoption, Senator Javits stated "the [FLSA's] criminal penalty in cases of willful
violation has been eliminated and a double damage liability substituted. This will furnish an effective
deterrent to willful violations and at the same time avoid the difficult problems of proof which would
arise under a criminal provision." See 113 CONG. REc. 7076 (1967). For cases finding a punitive aspect
of double damage awards, see Walker v. Pettit Constr., 605 F.2d 128, 130, modified on other grounds
sub nom. Frith v. Eastern Airlines, 611 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1979); Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559
F.2d 1036, 1040 (5th Cir. 1977); Rogers v. Exxon, 550 F.2d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1022 (1978).
Congress has also recognized that double damages have a compensatory effect. The word "liqui-
dated" implies compensatory damages of a predetermined amount awarded where it is difficult to
determine the actual measure of damages. Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572,
583-84 (1942) (liquidated damage award under the FLSA); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONmACTS
§ 356 comments a, b (1979). The legislative history of the 1978 amendments to the ADEA supports this
interpretation. H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 528, 535. The report states:
The House recedes with an amendment which provides for ajury trial on any issue of fact in an
action for recovery of amounts owing as a result of a violation of the ADEA. Under section 7(b),
which incorporates the remedial scheme of sections 11(b), 16 and 17 of the FLSA, "amounts
owing" contemplates two elements: first, it includes items of pecuniary or economic loss such as
wages, fringe, and other job-related benefits. Second, it includes liquidated damages (calculated
as an amount equal to the pecuniary loss) which compensate the aggrieved party for nonpecuniary
losses arising out of a willful violation of the ADEA.
The Supreme Court recently ruled that a plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial in ADEA actions for
lost wages, but it did not decide whether there is a right to jury trial on a claim for liquidated
damages. Because liquidated damages are in the nature of legal relief, it is manifest that a party is
entitled to have the factual issues underlying such a claim decided by a jury. The ADEA as
amended by this act does not provide remedies of a punitive nature. The conferees therefore agree
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states that the courts may award "such legal or equitable relief as may be
appropriate to effectuate the purposes" of the Act. 72 Based on that clause,
some plaintiffs argue they are entitled to remedies above and beyond
pecuniary and statutory double damages. 73 However, the circuit courts
unanimously hold that common law punitive damages, pain and suffering
damages, and emotional distress damages are not available under the
ADEA. 74 The courts reason that because the ADEA is based on the FLSA,
and because the FLSA does not provide for similar damages, the broad
ADEA language is restricted by the FLSA restraints. The courts also
conclude that the administrative conciliation process 75 would be hampered
by introducing the uncertainty of unmeasurable damages. 76 Some courts
also rely upon the availability of double damages. 77
The Dreyer standard is inconsistent with the Act's remedial goals. Under
Dreyer's outrageous conduct standard, double damages will be awarded in
far fewer intentional discrimination cases. The double damages' compen-
satory aspect will be essentially lost. Consequently, Dreyer's severe limita-
tion on double damages will leave age discrimination victims considerably
worse off than they are under the Thurston standard.78
to permit a jury trial on the factual issues underlying a claim for liquidated damages because the
Supreme Court has made clear that an award of liquidated damages under the FLSA is not a
penalty but rather is available in order to provide full compensatory relief for losses that are "too
obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by liquidated damages."
Id. at 535 (citation omitted).
One court has used this statement to support denial of damages for pain and suffering. Pfeiffer v.
Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684, 687 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1039 (1982); see also Perrell v.
FinanceAmerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 657 (10th Cir. 1984); Hill v. Spiegel, Inc., 708 F.2d 233, 235
(6th Cir. 1983) (citing Pfeiffer with approval of reasoning). The Supreme Court did not consider the
legislative history to the 1978 ADEA amendments in Thurston.
72. 29 U.S.C. at § 626(b) (1982).
73. See infra note 74 and cases cited therein.
74. Perrell v. FinanceAmerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654,657 (10th Cir. 1984); Hill v. Spiegel, Inc., 708
F.2d 233, 235 (6th Cir. 1983); Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684, 686-88 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1039 (1982); Fiedler v. IndianHead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 809-10 (8th Cir.
1982); Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691,698 (9th Cir. 1981); Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst.,
590 F.2d 1292, 1295-96(4th Cir. 1979); Vasquez v. Eastern AirLines, 579 F.2d 107, 109 (1st Cir. 1978);
Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066
(1978); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 839-42 (3d Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 434
U.S. 1022 (1978).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1), (d) (1982). The Act grants employees the right to bring a civil action.
The employee cannot bring a private action, however, until 60 days after filing an EEOC complaint. The
Act directs the EEOC to seek to correct the unlawful practice by conciliation, conference and
persuasion during the 60-day period.
76. Fiedler, 670 F.2d at 809-10 (summarizing reasoning of other circuits in earlier cases).
77. See supra note 71.
78. Compare Dreyer v. ARCO Chemical, 801 F.2d 651, 658 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55
U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1987) (No. 86-1062) (in order to avoid duplicating compensatory
damages, a plaintiff is charged with showing additional evidence of outrageous conduct) with Thurston,
469 U.S. 111, 125 (1986) (Congress suggests that an employee not face difficult problems of proof).
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The Dreyer standard is contrary to the ADEA's statutory origins and
structure, as well as to its remedial goals. Congress specifically based
ADEA remedies on the FLSA rather than on Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act.79 A comparison of ADEA and Title VII remedies illustrates Dreyer's
incongruity. The severely limiting "outrageous conduct" standard, when
coupled with the lack of damages for nonpecuniary harm, makes the
ADEA remedy system resemble remedies under Title VII. Under the
FLSA, double damage awards are automatic, unless the employer is able to
prove it acted in good faith and in the reasonable belief it was not violating
the Act. 80 Under Title VII, however, remedies are limited to back pay and
equitable remedies such as reinstatement. 81 The Thurston standard resem-
bles the FLSA statutory structure by making liquidated damages available
through proof of knowing or reckless disregard, which may be negated by
evidence of good faith or reasonable belief. The Dreyer standard, on the
other hand, approximates Title VII remedies by stripping the plaintiff of
double damages in all but a few cases. Therefore, the Thurston standard is
consistent with the ADEA's statutory structure and origins while the
Dreyer standard is not.
C. The Dreyer Standard Fails to Appropriately Punish ADEA
Violations
The Dreyer standard fails because it does not properly punish the precise
employer actions the ADEA prohibits. The Supreme Court has expressly
decided that the double damages provision is punitive. 82 Therefore double
damages remedies should be structured to punish persons who willfully
violate the Act. "Willful," however imprecise, is a word describing mental
state. In civil litigation, it encompasses the concept of intent, in addition to
the lower mental states of knowledge or recklessness. Only in criminal
litigation is it used to describe malice and evil intent.8 3 If an employer is
found liable for age discrimination in a discrete employment situation, the
jury has, by definition, concluded the employer intentionally acted for an
illegal purpose.84 Such actions are willful by definition, yet the actions may
go unpunished under Dreyer's outrageous conduct standard.
Despite the Third Circuit's disclaimer to the contrary, by adopting an
"outrageous conduct" standard, Dreyer bootstraps a mental state of malice
79. See generally Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
80. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 260 (1982).
81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
82. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 125.
83. Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F2d 276, 280-84 (3d Cir. 1980), overruled on other grounds,
Dreyer v. ARCO Chemical, 801 F.2d 651 (3d Cir. 1986).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 23-31.
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into the "willfulness" definition. In Thurston, the Supreme Court specifi-
cally rejected the requirement that malice or specific intent be proved in
order to award double damages. Dreyer therefore imposes a higher stan-
dard for awarding double damages than the Supreme Court requires.
Double damages are not awarded to punish malice and ill-will; double
damages are awarded to punish intentional discrimination. Because these
violations are precisely the kind of employer actions the ADEA forbids,
such action should be punished. The Dreyer standard would prevent such a
result.
D. Dreyer Asks the Right Question, but Gives the Wrong Answer
The Dreyer court failed to consider an alternative view of Thurston's
two-tier requirement. Thurston's two-tier requirement may be read to
distinguish between conscious and unconscious violations: a distinction
that preserves two tiers of damages without perverting the ADEA's pur-
pose. In Dreyer, the Third Circuit correctly recognized that applying the
Thurston standard to discrete employment decisions results in a double
damage award whenever the employer is liable for pecuniary damages. The
court reasoned that this result conflicted with Thurston's statement that the
ADEA requires two tiers of damages. In struggling with this dilemma, the
Third Circuit created a standard inconsistent with the focus of the ADEA.
Applying the Thurston standard to all discrimination cases properly allo-
cates double damages between conscious and unconscious violations.
The Supreme Court's Thurston decision simply requires two levels of
damages in age cases in the aggregate. The Third Circuit developed the
"outrageous conduct" standard because it concluded that Thurston re-
quires two levels of remedies in each distinct fact pattern. 85 Thurston,
however, does not require this conclusion. Thurston discusses two tiers of
damages in language rejecting the "in the picture" standard. 86 The Court
reasoned that because the Act requires employers to post notices about the
Act's existence and purposes, employers will nearly always be aware of the
Act and its implications. 87 Accordingly, the "in the picture" standard
permitted a double damage award in both fact patterns, thus frustrating
Congress' intent to establish a two-tiered damage system. 88
By constructing a distinction between conscious and unconscious viola-
tions, the Thurston standard establishes a two-tier damage system when
85. Dreyer, 801 F.2d at 657.
86. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 127-28, 128 n.22; see supra text accompanying note 38.
87. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 128.
88. Id.
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age discrimination cases are examined in the aggregate. Unlike the out-
rageous conduct standard, the knew or showed reckless disregard standard
satisfies the ADEA's remedial goals. Courts assist age discrimination
victims and punish violators by awarding double damages if the employer
is liable in the discrete employment decision fact pattern. In these cases, the
factfinder has concluded the employer intentionally discriminated and that
any stated nondiscriminatory reasons are a pretext.89 However, in age-
based policy patterns, it is possible that the employer unconsciously
violated the Act if it instituted the policy in good faith.90 The Thurston
standard thus equates willful and nonwillful violations with conscious and
unconscious violations. The two-tier damage system is preserved for age
discrimination cases in the aggregate, and punishment for intentional
discrimination is maintained.
The "outrageous conduct" standard goes too far. In trying to reconcile
the apparent internal conflict between the Thurston standard's application
to discrete employment decisions and the need for two tiers of damages, the
Third Circuit distorts the Act's structure and fails to punish intentional
discrimination. A forced choice between fulfilling the ADEA's essential
function and providing two tiers of damages is unnecessary. Distinguishing
between conscious and unconscious violations allows two tiers of damages
in age discrimination cases in the aggregate. The knowing or reckless
disregard standard punishes the precise employer action the ADEA was
designed to prevent and preserves adequate compensation for age discrimi-
nation victims.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the ADEA to eradicate discrimination based on age. In
order to achieve this goal, Congress created a two-tiered remedy scheme:
equitable and legal remedies to reimburse the discrimination victims; and
double damages to punish and deter "willful" violations. In Trans World
Airlines v. Thurston, the Supreme Court approved a willful definition
which requires the plaintiff to show the employer "knew or showed reck-
less disregard for. . . whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA."
Every circuit considering the issue since Thurston chose to adopt this
language. However, in Dreyer v. ARCO Chemical, the Third Circuit re-
fused to follow the Thurston definition because it resulted in an automatic
89. See supra text accompanying notes 23-31.
90. Thurston provides a good example of a good faith enactment of a discriminatory policy. There,
the employer consulted with legal counsel and negotiated with the union. See supra text accompanying
notes 33-43.
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double damage award in cases involving discrete employment decisions.
Dreyer requires the plaintiff to produce additional evidence sufficient to
demonstrate "outrageous conduct" to support a double damage award.
The Dreyer decision should not be followed. The knowing or reckless
disregard standard should be used in both age-based policy patterns and
discrete employment decision cases. The Thurston standard, by equating
willful and non-willful violations with conscious and unconscious viola-
tions, punishes intentional ADEA violations and preserves adequate com-
pensation for age discrimination victims. Thurston thus preserves two tiers
of damages by examining age discrimination cases in the aggregate. In
contrast, the Dreyer standard imposes a higher standard of proof for
punitive awards than the statute requires and contorts the Act's statutory
structure.
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